Counter-motion of the Shareholder JG
»The actions of the members of the Board of Management
are not to be ratified« for the Annual Meeting
of the DaimlerChrysler AG on April 4th., 2007 in Berlin

Annual Meeting 2007


As follows, you will find counter-motions from shareholders who oppose the proposals made by the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board on the Agenda of the Annual Meeting on April 4, 2007, which the Company has to make accessible to all its shareholders.

9th Annual Meeting
of DaimlerChrysler AG
April 4, 2007, Berlin Trade Fair Center (Messe Berlin

Dear Shareholders,

For our Annual Meeting to be held in Berlin on April 4, 2007, some shareholders have submitted counter-motions to Agenda Items 3 and 4. The following counter-motions are listed in the order they were received by DaimlerChrysler.

Jürgen Grässlin, Freiburg, Germany

Regarding Item 3 of the Agenda:

»The actions of the members of the Board of Management are not to be ratified.


The Critical Shareholders' rejection of the Chrysler takeover has been proven right.

Former Board of Management Chairman Jürgen E. Schrempp's vision of 'Global Corporation DaimlerChrysler' was doomed to failure right from the start. For this reason, we, the Critical Shareholders (KADC, Arndtstraße 31, 70197 Stuttgart, Germany; phone +49 711 608396; and voted against the merger with Chrysler Corporation at the Annual Meeting on September 18, 1998 - the only (!) shareholders' association to do so. Already at that time, we insistently warned against the merger and insistently pointed out the following dangers in both verbal and written form:

* 'More than seventy percent of mergers do not achieve their goals. A large number of mergers have failed.'
* 'The top management is the real winner of the merger. Risk-free stock options promote the self-enrichment of Schrempp, Eaton & Co. With the merger, the salaries of the Daimler Board of Management members were adjusted upwards. The difference in earnings in the new company between top management and employees in production became much larger. While the Board of Management preached that employees should tighten their belts, they themselves were on the gravy train.'
* '100,000 jobs were at stake.'
* 'The merger slowed the anyway insufficient efforts to make the Daimler-Benz product range more ecological. Instead of implementing a technically feasible reduction of fuel consumption by half, the range of cars was expanded by dinosaur vehicles of yesteryear.'
* 'Even after the merger with Chrysler, through its equity holdings Daimler remained the biggest German producer of weapons of war / armaments.' (Excerpts from the leaflet distributed at the Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting entitled 'Information on the Merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler').

Billions pulverized for Mitsubishi and Chrysler

What we warned against has all come true. If the Board of Management had taken the warnings of the Critical Shareholders seriously at that time, the Group - and thus the shareholders - would have avoided billions in losses due to the mistaken corporate strategy. Several billion euros, pulverized to finance so-called 'restructuring and turnaround programs' at Mitsubishi and Chrysler, could have been invested sensibly at Mercedes-Benz to create jobs and improve quality.

Billions wasted through the delayed examination of all options

The members of the Board of Management failed to make the urgent decision to sell the Chrysler division in good time with as much profit as possible for the shareholders and as socially acceptably as possible for the employees. In the years 2001 and 2003 alone, Chrysler posted losses totaling 5.8 billion euros, which were missing at the Mercedes Car Group to improve quality, to develop more environmentally friendly vehicles, and thus to safeguard jobs. Already at that time, what we DaimlerChrysler Critical Shareholders had warned against at an earlier date became clear. The Board of Management should have taken the opportunity to sell the Chrysler division when it temporarily got into the black in 2004 and 2005 with profits of 1.4 and 1.5 billion euros respectively. Instead of that, Dr. Dieter Zetsche reacted far too late and waited for Chrysler's latest loss of more than one billion euros in the year 2006. Not until the beginning of 2007, and therefore far too late, the Chairman of the Board of Management announced that he intended to 'examine all options'.
Even if it is possible to sell Chrysler in the near future, the price will be far below the value of recent years, and tens of thousands of employees have already been dismissed. Overall, the procedure of the DaimlerChrysler Board of Management is evidence of a completely mistaken assessment of the risks and success prospects of the 'global corporation' and of their own lack of ability to step on the emergency brake in good time.

The Critical Shareholders demand the implementation of a series of actions.

Today, our company is in the self-induced strategy trap, out of which only sustainable and future-oriented decisions will lead. These include measures to be taken in the short and medium term, the implementation of which must be socially acceptable for the employees: In addition to the immediate exit from Chrysler, this means terminating, with no replacement, the Maybach production, making the entire vehicle range ecological, and concentrating on the core automobile business with an exit from armaments production of warplanes, nuclear weapons carriers and cluster munitions, as well as inhuman weapons transfers. Only this realignment of business policy will secure added value and maintain or add to the number of jobs, and thus also the continued existence of the Daimler Group.«